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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

IN RE ANTHONY W.: THE ACCOMPLICE
CORROBORATION RULE APPLIES TO JUVENILE
PROCEEDINGS

By: Taren Stanton
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals ofMaryland held
the accomplice corroboration rule, which states uncorroborated
accomplice testimony is insufficiently reliable to be sole basis for a
conviction, applies to juvenile proceedings. In re Anthony W., 388
Md. 251, 255, 879 A.2d 717, 719 (2005). Further, the Court held the
juvenile court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the State's
witnesses were not accomplices whose testimony required
corroboration. /d.
During the night of May 10, 2002, Jose Gonzales ("Gonzales"),
Keith Steers ("Steers"), and Anthony W. ("Anthony") were driving
aimlessly around Frederick County. According to Steers, Anthony
told Gonzales to stop the car in the parking lot of Kemptown
Elementary School and Gonzales complied. Anthony exited and went
toward a school bus. Anthony broke glass in the front door, entered
the bus, smashed a number of windows and sprayed the interior with a
fire extinguisher. Steers and Gonzales testified they entered the bus
and attempted to stop Anthony from causing additional damage.
Steers and Gonzales testified they did not break any windows, but
admitted to stealing a box of flares from the bus. Anthony was
charged in juvenile court with malicious destruction of property based
in part on the testimony of Steers and Gonzales. Neither Steers nor
Gonzales were prosecuted in exchange for their testimony.
At the conclusion of the State's case, Anthony moved for dismissal.
He alleged the State's case consisted of uncorroborated testimony
from two accomplices, Gonzales and Steers. The motion was denied.
On November 14, 2002, the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting
as a Juvenile Court, found that Anthony was involved in the
delinquent act. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court concluding the two witnesses were accomplices to the
illegal act and therefore their testimony required corroboration.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the State's petition for
writ of certiorari to evaluate two issues. First, whether the Court of
Special Appeals erred in holding the accomplice corroboration rule
applied in juvenile cases. Second, whether the Court of Special
Appeals erred in concluding that insufficient evidence was presented
to find the two witnesses were accomplices whose testimony required
corroboration to sustain the juvenile's adjudication.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by examining the
accomplice corroboration rule as applied to adults. !d. at 264-265, 879
A.2d at 724-725. The Court noted that the accomplice corroboration
rule was first stated in Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 ( 1911)
and the necessity for the rule was later explained in Watson v. State,
208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955). Anthony W., 388 Md. at 264, 879
A.2d at 724. The rule was upheld in Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 378
A.2d 1104 (1977), because of the trend to use accomplices as State's
witnesses and the concerns about the reliability of accomplice
testimony. Anthony W., 388 Md. at 264-265, 879 A.2d at 724-725.
The Court relied substantially on juvenile case law in determining
whether the rule applied to juvenile proceedings. !d. at 265-267, 879
A.2d at 725-726. The development of specific protections similar to
those provided adults was first discussed in depth by the United States
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
Anthony W., 388 Md. at 266, 879 A.2d at 725. Since Gault, this Court
recognized that some, but not all, rights granted to a criminal
defendant were applicable in juvenile proceedings. Anthony W., 388
Md. at 267, 879 A.2d at 726 (citing In re Thomas J, 372 Md. 50, 5859,811 A.2d 310,315 (2002)).
Although the Court had previously addressed the application of
constitutional protections to juveniles, it noted that this specific
evidentiary rule had not been analyzed. !d. at 267, 879 A.2d at 726.
Accordingly, the Court looked to other jurisdictions that had discussed
the issue for guidance. !d. The Court found support for extending the
rule in a Georgia statute that "requires that a Court must find on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason
of which he is alleged to be delinquent." !d. at 268, 879 A.2d at 726727 (citing TL.T v. State, 212 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1975)). Based on the
statute, the court in TL. T concluded that a juvenile charged with
delinquency was entitled to "independent corroborative evidence of an
accomplice's testimony." Anthony W., 388 Md. at 268-269, 879 A.2d
at 727. The Court also found a Nevada opinion which extended the

2006]

The Accomplice Corroboration Rule

67

corroboration rule to juvenile proceedings. I d. (citing A Minor v.
Juvenile Dept. Fourth Jud. Dist., 608 P.2d 509 (1980)).
The Court found that Maryland Rule § 11-114(e)( 1), requiring
allegations that a juvenile committed a delinquent act be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, was most similar to juvenile court statutes
in Georgia and Nevada. Id. at 271-272, 879 A.2d at 729. The Court
also recognized the right of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied
to both adults and juveniles by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 272,
879 A.2d at 729. Since the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof is the same standard applied in adult criminal cases, the Court
held the same evidentiary concerns regarding accomplice testimony
were also present in juvenile cases. Id. The Court found further
support from the Court of Special Appeals of Mary land, which pointed
out that a juvenile faced with placement in a state facility is no less
entitled to benefit of the rule than an adult faced with possible
incarceration for committing an offense. Id. at 273, 879 A.2d at 729.
Although Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure governs
juvenile proceedings, the Court concluded the rule should be extended
to juvenile proceedings in the interest of fundamental fairness. Id.
Furthermore, the Court held the Court of Special Appeals erred in
concluding insufficient evidence was proffered to find the two
witnesses were accomplices to the delinquent act. Id. at 280, 879 A.2d
at 734. The Court of Appeals found support for its argument by
analogizing the facts to Coleman v. State, 209 Md. 379, 386, 121 A.2d
254, 257 (1956) and Seward v. State, 208 Md. 341, 346, 118 A.2d 505,
507 (1955). Anthony W, 388 Md. at 274-275, 879 A.2d at 730-731.
In Coleman, the accomplice corroboration rule did not apply because
there was evidence that the alleged accomplice sat outside in the truck
while the crime occurred and had no knowledge that a crime was
planned. Anthony W, 388 Md. at 275, 879 A.2d at 731. In Seward,
the defendant admitted that all participants in the act discussed setting
off a bomb and knew he was making the bomb, so the accomplice rule
applied. Anthony W, 388 Md. at 275, 879 A.2d at 731. Thus, the
Court determined that Gonzales and Steers may have committed
independent crimes at some point in the continuum but such acts did
not make them accomplices to the act at issue. Id. at 279, 879 A.2d at
733. There was no evidence that the witnesses knew Anthony
intended to commit the delinquent acts and a rational trier of fact could
have found that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices. Id.
In In re Anthony W, the Court of Appeals of Maryland established
that the accomplice corroboration rule applied to juvenile proceedings.
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This decision broadened the constitutional rights accorded to
juveniles. More importantly, this case highlights the many parallels
between adult and juvenile proceedings and the need for due process
rights of all individuals, regardless of age. Furthermore, this decision
reflects an increasingly common view of juvenile offenders as young
criminals rather than youth in need of rehabilitation. As juvenile
courts gain increasingly more constitutional rights, the need for a
separate and distinct juvenile system may become less essential in the
administration of justice.

